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In the spring of 2010, an impressive book was published to celebrate the 80th birthday of 
professor Zoltán Péteri. The ﬁ rst part comprises short personal greetings from internationally 
known colleagues–Attila Harmathy, Géza Herczegh, Vanda Lamm, Ferenc Mádl, Csaba 
Varga and János Zlinszky. The second part offers a panorama of professor Péteri’s most 
important writings related to the theoretical questions of comparative law.
In the early years of his career, Zoltán Péteri  focused his research on the questions of 
legal and political theory. Following this period he turned to problems of the rule of law, 
human rights and constitutional law. However, the focus of his oeuvre has always been 
related to the world of comparative law. He edited several volumes of the Hungarian 
national reports submitted to the international congresses of comparative law and he has 
been teaching at the Faculté internationale de droit comparé for long decades.
1. In the ﬁ rst essay–The Beginnings of Comparative Law in English Jurisprudence–, 
following a well-developed historical introduction, the author points out that the comparative 
method was adopted in English jurisprudence due to the inﬂ uence of Maine. Pollock, who 
also accepted the interconnected nature of historical and comparative methods, warned that 
comparison only makes sense among institutions of civilizations being at the same stage. 
Another important step was the establishment of the Society of Comparative Legislation–
following the example of the French Société de legislation comparée–in 1894. The main 
aim of this scholarly society was to study the law of people living in the British 
Commonwealth and to make the ﬁ ndings of these studies applicable for practice. It must 
also be mentioned that this society did not neglect the study of European legal systems 
either, e.g. for the reform of English criminal law.
2. In the introduction of the second paper–Theoretical Questions of Comparative Law 
in Soviet Jurisprudence–, Péteri refers to the process during which the rejection of 
comparative law gradually turned to the acceptance of a socialist version of comparative 
law. Then he discusses the fundamental questions of comparative law in the light of a 
monograph written by A. A. Tille, the leading personality of Soviet comparative law of the 
time. Concerning the origins of comparative law, Péteri rejects both the antique and 
medieval origin of comparative law, and points out–contrary to Tille and others–that the 
birth of comparative law dates back to the turn of 19th and 20th century. Péteri bravely 
1 Editors: Balázs Fekete and András Koltay.
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advocates the autonomy of the theory of comparative law against those approaches of 
Socialist jurisprudence emphasizing its secondary and applied nature. Last but not least, the 
author does not even share the conception of Tille about the existence of comparative law 
within the frontiers of a given country. The solution of collisions of the different legislative 
levels within the Soviet Union is a problem of the system of legal sources rather than one of 
legal comparison, since the precondition for comparison is the existence of at least two 
legal systems.
3. The next essay–Some Preliminaries to the Comparison of Legal Cultures–inspiringly 
discusses one of the most important questions of today’s comparative law, the role of legal 
cultures in the comparison.2 In the introduction, the author rightly stresses that the 
connection between law and cultural phenomena was already recognized by the philosophical 
schools of the late 19th century. In the literature of comparative law, the approach to law as 
a cultural phenomenon was related to Kohler, who was otherwise named Hegel-redivivus 
by his contemporaries. One of Kohler’s main points was that law should always adapt to 
the culture of a given people, including its transformations, and it should also offer solutions 
to new challenges. Péteri shows that culture also has a value-function in Kohler’s 
approach.
A leading personality of Neo-Kantian philosophy, Radbruch, deﬁ nes law as cultural 
power, thus improving Kohler’s thesis. He also explains that the type of law (Rechtstyp) 
and the idea of law are the two standards that have to be applied in the comparison of 
different legal systems.
During the ﬁ rst International Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900) the whole 
issue got a new interpretation in the discussions related to the emergence of the new 
discipline of droit comparé. Kohler, for one, pointed out that a nation can only accept 
foreign rules which are in harmony with its conditions and institutions. Moreover, Zittelmann 
argued that the main value of comparative law was its capacity to approach law as a cultural 
phenomenon.
The author concludes by claiming that the advantage of the approach called 
“comparative legal cultures” consists in enabling comparative law to ﬁ nd a way out of the 
uncertainties related to a recent paradigm shift. It also seems possible, however, that the 
“comparative legal cultures” approach may make comparative law lose its relationship to 
law and assimilate to legal theory, legal anthropology or even to the sociology of law.
4. The fourth essay–Paradigm Shift in Comparative Law?–analyses an exciting and 
important problem. Péteri draws attention to the fact that the analysis of the paradigms of 
comparative law is part of the history of comparative law not yet written. Furthermore, he 
cannot accept the approach in the history of ideas which declares that the beginnings of 
comparative law could be discovered even at the earliest stages of human thinking.
The dominant view suggests that comparative law–called droit comparé in the years of 
its birth–has a relatively short history. Some scholars say it starts with the First International 
Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900), others date it back to the 1860s or the 
2 From the Hungarian literature see Kulcsár, K.: Jogszociológia (Sociology of Law). Budapest, 
1997; Varga, Cs.: Összehasonlító jogi kultúrák (Comparative legal cultures). Budapest, 2000; 
Visegrády, A.: Jogi kultúra, jogelmélet, joggyakorlat (Legal culture, legal theory and the practice of 
law). Budapest, 2003; Kondorosi, F.–Marosi, K.–Visegrády, A.: A világ jogi kultúrái – a jogi kultúrák 
világa (Legal cultures of the world–the world of legal cultures). Budapest, 2008.
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establishment of the ﬁ rst scholarly society (Société de legislation comparée, 1869) devoted 
to the ﬁ eld. 
From the aspect of the history of ideas, Maine’s Ancient Law can be regarded as a 
starting point. However, as the author points out, the so-called legal ethnology was also 
seriously related to the ﬁ rst paradigm of comparative law. This ﬁ rst paradigm had been 
dominant until the First International Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900).
According to the new concept or paradigm emerging at this congress, it was reasonable 
to draw a dividing line between the formerly dominant, mostly theoretical comparative law 
and droit comparé properly understood. As Lambert argued, the former is strongly related 
to legal history or sociology of law, while the other is a new branch of the study of positive 
law. During the interwar period, the research of similar or different solutions in Common 
Law and Civil Law systems came to the fore at the levels of both written and case-law. This 
transformation was a sign of paradigm-shift in itself and it could imply that Far-Eastern or 
even Socialist laws could also be compared. After World War II, scholars tried to ﬁ nd some 
convergence between Socialist and Western laws, some of them even regarded Socialist law 
as a degenerated branch of Western Law. But from the 1950s, the new paradigm identiﬁ ed 
Socialist Law as an independent legal family on the basis of ideological factors, and it 
focused on the research of the style of legal families as well as their “determining” and 
“interchangeable” elements.
If a new paradigm shift may happen in the close future, it will be lead by advocates of 
the so-called “comparative legal cultures” approach–Péteri argues.
5. The ﬁ fth study–Sociological Questions in Comparative Law–discusses the problems 
of sociological approach in comparative law. Péteri starts by emphasizing that the failure of 
promising opportunities in legal uniﬁ cation based on comparative law was related to socio-
economic relations behind the legal regulation. There is, however, a serious question related 
to this point. Does the research of sociological background of the legal institutions in the 
context of Socialist legal system mean the twilight of the classical approach in droit 
comparé? The author answers negatively, since the sociological approach was also applied 
by representatives of Western droit comparé, mostly in order to achieve practical means.
The reason why the earlier, unilateral normative approach was replaced with a 
sociological one is the fact that the main goals of comparative law cannot be achieved 
nowadays by simply juxtaposing legal rules. Consequently, one really needs the sociological 
approach. Moreover, this complex approach allows for a better consideration of value 
elements in the theory of comparative law. By way of a conclusion, Péteri points out that 
this approach is the essence of comparative law, and it could also serve as the proper basis 
for a “realist” comparative law capable of studying the sociological roots of legal and state-
related phenomena.
6. In the sixth essay–Theoretical Questions of the Application of the Comparative 
Method in the Sphere of State Phenomena–the author highlights that this issue has been 
rather neglected in the literature of comparative law thus far. However, new behaviorist 
approaches show a comprehensive departure from the rule-centered approach in comparative 
law. Furthermore, the view has also been spreading among scholars that the aim of 
comparative law is not only the observation of similarities, and that the study of differences 
is equally of scientiﬁ c value.
The sociological aspect in general or in particular can be the starting point of any 
comparison. As Péteri emphasizes, the real task is to give some relevance to the sociological 
aspects of state phenomena in terms of comparison. The term “state phenomenon” refers to 
legally deﬁ ned state phenomena or institutions. This special socio-legal approach has the 
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following main criteria: (1) besides the legal framework, also principles have to be taken 
into account, (2) in the study of a given state institution, historical, moral and other traditions 
should also be considered, and (3) the function of the given state institution should also be 
analyzed.
7. The following pages–Goals and Methods of Comparative Law–introduce the reader 
to the goals and methods of comparative law. The author begins by asserting that there is no 
“Chinese Wall” between the ﬁ elds of theoretical and applied comparative law, but their 
intersection is increasingly typical. However, the extension of comparative law to the legal 
practice and other factors inﬂ uencing both legislation and practice enriched the so-called 
“legal approach” with sociological elements. Last but not least, the emergence of Socialist 
state and law also enforced the reinterpretation of the goals and methods of 
comparative law. 
One of the fundamental questions of modern comparative law is whether Western and 
Socialist legal systems can be compared at all. According the position of Péteri, the 
opportunities of the comparison of earlier legal systems are limited since their social 
principles are rather different. Thus, a sociological approach has to be applied in research, 
as a simple declaration of formal similarities does not make much sense in a comparative 
study–he argues. This is also relevant when one investigates the development of states and 
legal systems or evaluates state and legal phenomena.
8. The next paper–Comparative Law and Legal Theory–analyses the relationship 
between comparative law and legal theory. The ﬁ rst important problem discussed here is the 
recognition of comparative law as an independent discipline. Emphasizing the signiﬁ cance 
of Maine’s oeuvre, Péteri also points out the important role of Pollock, who stated that 
jurisprudence has to be historical and comparative at the same time. Thus, comparative law 
was regarded as an autonomous ﬁ eld of research. Moreover, from the 1870s it had a 
department in Oxford under the direction of Maine and his fellows.
A new approach to the scientiﬁ c nature of droit comparé was formulated during the 
First International Comparative Law Congress (Paris, 1900). Lambert claimed that the task 
of comparative law is to help the formulation and emergence of the so-called common 
legislative law (droit commun legislative). This position was reﬁ ned in the following 
decades by dividing comparative law to two ﬁ elds of study: comparative legal history and 
comparative legislation.
In Hungary, comparative law occupied a central position in the oeuvre of Szalay and 
Wenczel. In a few decades, however, another approach became increasingly popular. It 
emphasized the subordinate nature of comparative law to general legal theory, and was 
advocated by scholars like Pikler or Moór. The jurisprudence of the Socialist era regarded 
comparative law as a method or transitory science. Péteri convincingly refutes this view 
and stresses the independence of comparative law.
In the concluding section, the author formulates an interesting and important position: 
“If one can speak of some kind of plurality within general legal theory, the basis for that 
can only be the different levels of abstraction. On the basis of that, one could even speak of 
general legal theories belonging to different legal families (as the Romano-Germanic, 
Common Law or Scandinavian legal families). Yet for formulating the most general 
theoretical conclusions, the best instrument is a legal theory having the most general scope 
and embracing all the legal systems. Thus, plurality within legal theory is possible and we 
think that a general legal theory has to be developed, which recognizes the different groups 
of legal systems.”
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9. The work continues with a discussion of the concept of “Western Law”–Some 
Remarks about the “Decline of Western Law”. After an overview of the main ideas 
concerning the taxonomy of legal systems, Péteri quotes an opinion, according to which the 
simple comparison of all the legal systems is impossible and unnecessary. Therefore, what 
is really needed, is their classiﬁ cation. The approach based on the concept of legal culture 
can enrich comparative studies with new insights.
But what does the concept of “West” mean for comparative law? On the basis of the 
widely spread distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, Péteri reminds the reader 
that the term of Western Law was introduced in comparative law by David in 1950. The 
aim of David was to distinguish it from Socialist Law. It also has to be mentioned that by 
using this term David emphasized the unity of Civil Law and Common Law due to 
capitalism, liberalism, and Christian ethics. Even though David did not think this concept of 
Western Law was applicable in 1969, the concept of a common Western Law is still used in 
comparative law.
10. The author discusses the question of whether Hungarian Law can be integrated into 
any legal family of the world in a most interesting and scholarly paper–Hungarian Law and 
the Legal Families of the World. He thinks this question can be answered by focusing on 
the “styles” of the different periods of Hungarian legal history.
Medieval Hungarian law was part of the so-called Romano-Germanic legal family, but 
it also had some peculiarities. Either the doctrine of the Holy Crown and the lack of a 
codiﬁ ed constitution, or the resistance to the codiﬁ cation of private law can be regarded as 
differences from the general features of this legal family.
In the wake of World War II, Hungary got under Soviet inﬂ uence and rule and 
consequently it became a member of the Socialist legal family. However, this was a 
somewhat unusual situation, since the Hungarian legal system underwent serious 
transformations, not only in a material, but also in a formal sense. Péteri points out that this 
formal transformation disrupted both the ancient roots and the former style of Hungarian 
law. In this process of transformation the newly enacted Socialist codes and the consequent 
rejection of both customary law and judge-made law played an important role. The 
constitution of 1949 symbolized a rupture with the former historical constitutional system. 
Moreover, Péteri adds, this constitution–contrary to many changes–remains the constitution 
of Hungary up to our days. The democratic transition in 1989 meant the return to the 
Romano-Germanic legal family in a legal sense.
11. As a ﬁ rst problem of the next paper–Traditions and Human Rights in Hungary–
Péteri mentions three factors which inﬂ uenced the formation of political and human rights 
in Hungary: ﬁ rst of all the English, French and German ideas, secondly the historical 
Hungarian constitution, and thirdly the Marxist ideology.
Imposing limits on the king’s power, the Golden Bull of András II is rather similar to 
the English Magna Carta. This act, indeed, codiﬁ ed the legal position and privileges of the 
nobility emerging in the 13th century. The Tripartitum of 1514 also comprised these and it 
was living law until the 19th century. The improvement of the position of the peasantry 
could  happen relatively slowly, mostly by the abolition of the feudal tenures in the 19th 
century. In the reformist movement emerging at the end of the 18th century, it was not the 
so-called third class (tiers état) but the nobility which acted as the leading force of the 
socio-political transformation.
As an example of the 20th-century Marxist interpretation of civil and human rights, the 
author gives a detailed analysis of the constitution and statehood of both the Soviet Council’s 
Republic and the People’s Republic. Lastly, Péteri points out that the main feature of the 
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recent developments is that the role of human and civil rights includes the limitation of 
state intervention as well as the protection of the individual sphere of liberty.
12. In what follows–Comparative Aspects in the Administration of the Law–the author 
scrutinizes the responsibility of judges and other functionaries dealing with the application 
of law. He ﬁ rst deﬁ nes the three main features of the application of law: it is (1) not a 
mechanical activity, it is (2) obligatory for the judges, and (3) it has a comprehensive 
nature.
Placing the issue into a more general framework, Péteri continues his discussion with 
the comparison of European legal families. In so-called “Continental” legal systems, the 
“birth” of law is basically limited to the process of parliamentary legislation. However, 
Common Law systems look for the origin of law in the conventions, customs and traditions 
of society, that is, in the real behavior of people living together.
There are further differences between the two legal families in terms of the relationship 
of legislation and application of law. The prohibition of judge-made law is still a valid rule 
in Continental systems, although one can mention certain efforts to change this attitude.3 
Without doubt, Common Law is judge-made law.
The author reminds that if we look for the road leading back to Europe, we should 
harmonize our ancient traditions with the determining factors of European legal development. 
And we can count on the fact that both legal families are parts of what is called Western 
Law. Moreover, we should recall Zlinszky’s dictum: the more legal knowledge, the more 
empowerment from the society, and the more responsibility.
13. One of the most important challenges to both European and Hungarian legal 
development is legal uniﬁ cation and legal harmonization. In the theoretical foundations of 
these processes, certain aspects of comparison can play a prominent role.
As the author rightly points out, legal harmonization only means the application of 
similar or equivalent solutions, while legal uniﬁ cation implies more. It implies that a new 
common regulation replaces former–divergent–rules. In terms of legal uniﬁ cation, one can 
speak of “internal” (within the national law) or international ones, while legal harmonization 
can be bilateral, regional or multilateral.
For all kinds of legal uniﬁ cation or harmonization, there are two fundamental questions 
to be discussed. Are they possible and desirable at all?
Obviously, the simple knowledge of legal rules is insufﬁ cient for legal uniﬁ cation. 
Their social, economic, political and ideological context has to be studied as well. For 
instance, uniﬁ cation is much less difﬁ cult between two countries having the same or similar 
ideological and political background. It is not mere coincidence that the traditionally 
successful ﬁ elds of international legal uniﬁ cation were private and commercial law, while 
the uniﬁ cation of public law was considered as a mere dream by the participants of the First 
International Congress of Comparative Law. The author concludes that the activity of EU 
member states in the ﬁ eld of legal uniﬁ cation is really facilitated by the fact that their 
common intellectual heritage is strongly related to the Mediterranean culture with Jewish 
and Christian roots.
14. The last paper–Teaching of Comparative Law and Comparative Law Teaching–is 
devoted to the problem of legal education. The author starts from two premises. Firstly, he 
3 See Visegrády, A.: A bírói joggyakorlat jogfejlesztő szerepe. (The role of jurisprudence in the 
development of law). Budapest, 1998.
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declares the necessity of a reform of legal education. Secondly, he accepts that the challenges 
of globalization render the spreading of a comparative attitude necessary.
When dealing with the question of comparative law in legal education, one has to 
discuss two different aspects: the teaching of comparative law as an independent subject on 
the one hand, and the reform of the entire legal education by applying a comparative attitude 
on the other.
Nowadays there exist different models of comparative law teaching in the law schools 
of the world: (a) the teaching of comparative law within the framework of legal theory, (b) 
the teaching of the main legal families of the world, (c) the teaching of national law 
compared to a foreign legal system, and lastly (d) the teaching of a given legal institution 
on a comparative basis.
According to Péteri, it is more suitable to talk about two different courses: (a) an 
introductory and theoretical course and (b) the comparative discussion of foreign legal 
systems. The ﬁ rst has its own place in the curriculum of legal theory classes, while the 
second is related to the teaching of various ﬁ elds of law. The author endorses the proposal 
that an independent introductory comparative law course should be integrated into legal 
curricula.
Discussing the history of comparative law teaching in Hungary, Péteri points out that it 
started in 1850 at the law faculty of Pest (Wenczel). Subsequently, there were two main 
tendencies. Some scholars studied the kinship between Hungarian and Common Law 
(Grosschmid), while others interpreted comparative law as one of the methods of studying 
positive law (Pauler, Somló and Pikler).
As for the developments after 1945, it should be mentioned that besides the courses 
concentrating on the comparative aspects of a given legal institution, also introductory 
classes on general comparative law appeared in Hungarian law faculties.
In addition to the above chapters, the book also includes a bibliography of the author 
and the abstracts of the papers, in French or English.
***
One ﬁ nal remark. This volume is an important piece of droit comparé for many 
reasons. Its value is, ﬁ rst of all, due to its subject and methodology, then to its insightful 
ﬁ ndings, and ﬁ nally to the fact that it deals with some of the most fundamental and current 
questions of comparative law. These questions are analyzed with a critical attitude. One 
may conclude by saying that this book deserves a place in the library of everyone–legal 
academics as well as practitioners–who deals with questions of legal theory, legal history, 
or EU law.
